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Miguel Augustin Kreling 
INTilODUCTION 
One thing that strikes a novice in the study of American Environmental Law is that 
tbe whole federal legal system that seeks to protect the nation's environment is constitutionally 
rooted on that same regulatory power - the Commerce Power - that seeks to enhance the 
nation's economy. 1 The undisputed fact that environmental protection and economic 
expansion have hardly found advocates inclined to compromising in the political arena 
brings about an apparent paradox that is deeply felt in the innermost entrails of the American 
legal system. The Union's authority to protect the environment is recognized only to the 
extent that the environmental activity to be regulated affects commerce arn.ong States. It 
appears that while a traditional commonplace is that economic prosperity is inherently 
environmentally unfriendly, the federal environmental legal system is constitutionally predicted 
precisely on the opposite assumption - that commerce among States cannot be maintained 
and enhanced unless the environment is preserved. Indeed, under a broader perspective 
there is no doubt that the maintenance of the Earth's life supporting natural system is a 
precondition to the very continuance of human life and, a fortiori, of the general social 
welfare achievable through the unencumbered practice of commerce. However, under a 
more immediate perception -- and one that is considerably more present in the political 
debate - it is accepted as a matter of fact, particularly under the scientific paradigm introduced 
by Lavoisier,2 that no social wealth can be created and no economic undertaking can take place 
without exerting any effect on the ambient environment. 
1 My debts of gratitude to Professor Catherine Tinker for her guidance in writing this paper. 
2 Lavoisier is often quoted for saying that in nature "nothing is lost, nothing is created, everything is 
transformed", as he referred to that matter is conserved through any chemical reaction, the weight of 
reagents equaling that of products. 
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The Commerce Power-based constitutional structure of federal Environmental Law 
places at the very cradle of the entire environment-protective framework - i.e. at the its 
constitutional source level- environment-versus-economy-like tensions, in such a manner 
that pro--development propositions can take the form of constitutional attacks on 
environment-oriented measures. Such structure raises3 questions as to whether the 
constitutional forum is an apt one for the discussion of such tensions, whether the structure 
does not put the whole system under the mercy of changing political will to a counter-
effective extent, whether it reasonably reconciles or unduly exacerbates such tensions and 
whether it does not subdue environmental values to the prevailing economic interests of 
the nation in such a way that a proper balance, instead of stricken, is easily tipped in the 
industry lobbyists' favor .. Ultimately one could ask whether such a structure does not pose a 
limit to the development of environmental law in the sense that the state of the law tends 
not to accurately represent the democratic proclivities of the American people. 
Issues as those involved in such inquiries are tentatively approached in this paper in 
a way that does not purport to be comprehensive neither novel. The paper deals generally 
with the Commerce Power and specifically with the federalist principle (Section 1), the 
Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution (Section 2), and the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Commerce Power through history (Section 3). 
1. THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM: A DOUBLE SECURITY AGAINST TYRANNY 
The protection of citizens' fundamental liberties against tyranny was a strong 
concern of the Founding Fathers of the American democracy and its Constitution's Framers. 
Accordingly, the exercise of the power delegated by the people to the Union was limited 
geographically, as the States surrendered only a portion of their original sovereignty, and 
structurally, as it was entrusted to three independent and coordinate branches. Madison 
explicated the Founders' design:~ 
"In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is 
submitted to the administration of a single government; and 
the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the 
government ilnto distinct and separate departments. In the 
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the 
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and 
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and 
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights 
of the people. The different governments will control each other, 
at the same time that each will be controlled by itself." 
3 At least from the viewpoint of a beginner in the studies of American Environmental Law or even of 
a beginner in the studies of American Law as well as social and political institutions, particularly of 
one having a Brazilian background as is the author's case. 
4 The Federalist No. 51, at 350-51 0· Cooke ed. 1961). 
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A principle of division of power was thus embodied in the Constitution, 5 particularly 
in its provisions setting up the federalist system of government and the system of checks 
and balances,6 as a "double security" intended to guard the people's rights.7 Justice O'Connor 
made the following remark:8 
"Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate 
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy 
balance of power between the States and the Federal 
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from 
either front." 
This essay is primarily concerned with the federalist aspect. Advantages that the 
"federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people" were pointed out by Justice 
O'Connor: 9 
"It assures a decentralized government that will be more 
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it 
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic 
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation 
in government; and it makes government more responsive 
by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry ... 
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check 
on abuses of government power. .. In the tension between 
frderal and state power lies the promise of liberty." 
However persuasive the proposition in favor of a federalist system may have been, 
federalism in the United States "was born as a political compromise" - between the people's 
attachment to their State and the convenience, demonstrated by the challenges experienced 
under the Confederation, of a stronger central government - "rather than as a theoretical 
ideal." 10 
5 The Constitution of the United States of America, written in 1787, ratified in 1788, and in operation 
since 1789, is the world's longest surviving written charter of government. 
6 For instance, "Congress may pass laws but the President can veto them. The President can veto laws 
but Congress can override the veto with a 2/3 vote. The President and Congress may agree on a law 
but the Supreme Court can declare a law unconstitutional. The President can appoint Judges and 
other government officials but Senate must approve them. Supreme Court iudges have life terms but 
they can be impeached." http:/ /www.socialstudieshelp.com/Lesson_13_Notes.htm 
7 See Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000). 
8 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
9 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 4.58 (1991 ). 
10 Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 
CowM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1988). 
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Federalism11 basically consists of a "system of dual sovereignty"12 that mandates a 
"balance of power between the States and the Federal Government"13 and respects the 
portion of the States' sovereignty which they enjoyed before and retained with their joining 
the Union. 14 Indeed, the Amendment X (of 1791) of the Constitution reads that "[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Consequently, the powers 
delegated to the Federal Government are limited to those expressly enumerated in the 
Constitution. As Madison put it, "[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to 
the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite."15 Chief Justice Marshall artfully poetized the 
matter in Marbury v. j'vfadison: 16 
"[The people's] original and :supreme will organizes the 
government, and assigns, to different departments, their 
respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain 
limits not to be transcended by those departments. The 
government of the United States is of the latter description. 
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and 
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the 
constitution is written." 
2. THECOMMffiCEPOW'EfuAGOVERNMENfOFENUMERATEDPOWERS 
Although the principle that the federal government is one of enumerated powers 
and exercises only the powers constitutionally granted to it is plain and universally accepted, 
"the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and 
will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist". 17 Furthermore, it is the 
11 Federalism, rather than an "invention" exclusively American, is a unique blend of "national systems 
- like the French - and confederate systems ·- like the ancient Greek and early modern Dutch". 
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Crn. L. REV. 1484, 1492 (1987). 
12 Justice O'Connor in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). 
13 Justice Powell in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
14 
" ... [I]he people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions 
1~ssential to separate ;ind independent existence," and ... "without the States in union, there could be no such 
political body as the United States." Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent 
autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that 
the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and 
care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. 
The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States." 
Chief Justice Chase in Tex. v. \Xl'h.ite, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868) (quoting Lane County v. Or., 74 U.S. 71). 
15 The Federalist No. 45, at 313 Q. Cooke ed. 1961). 
16 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). 
17 Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US. 316, 405 (1819). 
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"the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is". 18 "The federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution";19 and the Supreme 
Court is the ultimate interpreter2° and expositor21 of the text of the Constitution. 
Among the federal government's enumerated powers, the "Commerce Clause is 
one of the most prolific sources of national power".22 It reads that "[t]he Congress shall 
have Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes."23 The essence of this paper's discussion derives from the words 
"commerce among the States"; as simple as they look, an unadvised reader would not 
suspect the greatly expanded meaning Congress and the Supreme Court have given these 
words in order to establish and uphold federal authority to regulate many of this country's 
most important activities. Perhaps through the judicial history of such clause one is even 
able to explore the peculiar nature oflegal construction and constitutional interpretation -
many times, a game consisting of straining words' meanings at the pleasure of the political 
climate - particularly in light of a constitution whose language, in relevant part, has not 
changed for over two centuries, whereas humankind in the meantime of its operation has 
undergone the most radical life-changing transformations since it has appeared on Earth's 
face and at the speediest pace ever. Undoubtedly, by observing the evolution of such clause's 
constitutional interpretation one could even question the very nature of law and uncover 
behind its apparent veil of rationality a realm of inconsistency and arbitrariness that inescapably 
negates any pretense of 0egal) scientificity; one could even asks herself whether such a law's 
character does not merely mirror human beings' unsettled and erratic disposition of spirit24 
and reflects the unavoidable hypocrisy of any appearance of self-confidence and resolve. 
But let's start with the plain language. What is commerce? Chief Justice Marshall, in 
Gibbons v. Ogden,25 suggested that commerce is traffic and intercourse: "It describes the 
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by 
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." .And what about "among states"; isn't its 
18 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
19 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958). 
20 Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186, 211 (1962). 
21 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000). 
22 H. P. Hood &. Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534 (1949). 
23 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution. 
24 Perhaps in this sense no one has penetrated so deeply into the human soul and expressed its nature 
so dramatically as Shakespeare in Macbeth: "Tomorrow; and tomorrow, and tomorrow, creeps in this 
petty pace from day to day to the last syllable of recorded time, and all our yesterdays have lighted 
fools the way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candlel Life's but a walking shadow, a poor pJayer that 
struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is heard no more: it is a tale told by an idiot, full of 
sound and fury, signifying nothing." (Act V, Scene V, Macbeth speaks as he learns from Seyton that the 
queen, Lady Macbeth, has just been found dead within the castle). 
25 22 U.S. 1, 190-91 (1824). 
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meaning so plain as to foil any intelligible elaboration on them? Apparently not! This is what 
Chief.Justice Marshall had to say about those innocent words in that same judgment:26 
"Comprehensive as the word ''among" is, it may very properly 
be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States 
than one. The phrase is not one which would probably have 
been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a 
State, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the 
enumeration of the particular classes of commerce, to which 
the power was to be extended, would not have been made, 
had the intention been to extend the power to every 
description. The enumeration presupposes something not 
enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language 
or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal 
commerce of a State. The genius and character of the whole 
government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all 
the external concerns of the nation, ancl to those internal 
concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those 
which are completely within a particular State, which do not 
affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, 
for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of 
the government. The completely internal commerce of a State, 
then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself."27 
In a later case·-- The Daniel Ball28 -- Justice Field stressed the same point: 
"There is undoubtedly an internal commerce which is subject 
to the control of the States. The power delegated to Congress 
is limited to commerce "among the several States,'' with foreign 
nations, and with the Indian tribes. This limitation necessarily 
excludes from Federal control all commerce not thus 
designated, and of course that commerce which is carried on 
entirely within the limits of a State, and does not extend to or 
affect other States." 
26 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194-95 (1824). 
27 Chief] ustice Marshall is said to have articulated in his opinion an organic theory of interstate 
commerce, pursuant to which the question is whether commerce affects more that one State, rather 
than a territorial one, where the question is whether commerce crosses a state line. The organic 
theory, though initially ignored by the Supreme Court, would be revisited and expanded as of the 
New Deal and onwards. JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CoNSTITUTIONALLAw IN A NUTSHELL 69 (West, 
5th ed. 2003). 
28 77 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1870). 
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What has been stated so far seems to suffice as for one to perceive that the two crucial 
questions one has to ask to ascertain federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause is 
whether the would-be regulated activity is an activity in the nature of commerce and whether 
such activity is not so locally restricted to the domain of a single State as to prevent federal 
interference. 
And finally what is the power originating from the Commerce Clause - the 
Commerce Power? Chief Justice Marshall went that far: 29 
"\X1e are now arrived at the inquiry- What is this power? It 
is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which 
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested 
in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost 
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are 
prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain 
terms ... If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty 
of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as 
to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress 
as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in 
its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the 
power as are found in the constitution of the United States. 
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity 
with the people, and the influence which their constituents 
possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as 
that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which 
they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the 
restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all 
representative governments.'' 
Perhaps in this early decision the Supreme Court already acknowledged the magnitude 
such power could potentially come to reach, especially if aided by the creative minds of 
lawyers, as a source of federal power over the States. It may be that by the first time the 
profound warning made by Justice Kennedy in United States v. Lopez30 - that "[i]n a sense 
any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or 
consequence" -was, even if unconsciously, felt within the Supreme Court's chambers, as it 
was grasped by the genius of Justice Marshall. However, in United States v. Morrison 31 
Chief .Justice Rehnquist reminded us that political accountability,, while not a negligible 
29 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196-97 (1824). 
30 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995). 
31 529 U.S. 598, 616 and 619 (2000). 
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restraint on congressional exercise of the Commerce Power, is a limit only "within that 
power's outer bounds" and that "Gibbons did not remove from this Court the authority to 
define that boundary", especially because "the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted 
as granting the Federal Government an unlimited license to regulate". 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's task of defining that boundary is not merely a 
matter of grammatical construction; to the contrary, it is primarily a matter of policy -- a 
balancing exercise between the competing interests of a strong economic unit and the fear of 
"economic Balkanization" ,32 on the one hand, and of a federalist security against government's 
abuse of power and the fear of tyranny, on the other - as Justice Jackson put it: 33 
"Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written word, 
this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this 
Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences of 
the Constitution." 
Finally, the Commerce Power cases have been analyzed under one of two contrasting 
inquiries that virtually mirror one another: an Act of Congress to survive a constitutionality 
attack must be either "authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of 
the Constitution"34 ()r not evasive of "the province of the state sovereignty reserved by the 
Tenth Amendment"'35 . In the end, as just O'Connor said "just as a cup may be half empty 
or half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question ... as one of ascertaining 
the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions 
of the Constitution or one of d~scerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under 
the Tenth Amendment."36 The proposition that the powers which are not conferred to the 
Federal Government are indeed withheld by the States or that the States retain their pre-
Union sovereignty "to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their 
original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government"37 is a tautological 
truism reasonably inferable from the constitutional scheme and redundantly reaffirmed by 
32 Hughes v. Oklahoma,, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979), Justice Brennan: "The few simple words of the 
Commerce Clause - "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce ... among the several 
States ... " - reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the 
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to 
avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies 
and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation." 
33 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). 
34 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
35 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Hammer \c Dagenhart, 247 US. 251 (1918) 
(federal statute restricting the interstate shipping of goods produced by child labor was held unconstitutional 
as invasive of the reversed powers of the States). Lane County v. Or., 74 U.S. 71 (1869); the Tenth Amendment. 
36 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-57 (1992). 
37 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985), per Justice Blackmun. 
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the Tenth Amendment.38 Ironically, while this proposition could not have been spelt out 
clearer by both the Tenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, it helps little as one attempts 
to draw the precise constitutional line between the federal and the state powers or to detemiine, 
primarily as a matter of degree, what specific powers or incidents thereof were actually 
granted or withheld and to what extent, notwithstanding the importance and delicacy of the 
matter (discussed at least as far back as 1816 in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee3~.40 
3. T'HE COMMERCE POWER IN HISTORlCAL PERSPECTIVE: DEFYING 
OR REWRITING THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM? 
Bearing in mind the political nature of constitutional interpretation, as alluded to 
in the preceding section, it should look natural that the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the scope of the Commerce Clause has changed over time; indeed varying political 
circumstances - from the foundation of the Union and the late 19th century's industrialization 
to the Great Depression and the recent past- have legitimately warranted differing positions. 
In the first century of the Republic,41 the Commerce Clause served less as an 
affirmative ground on which Congress asserted jurisdiction than as a negative limit on the 
States' powers, every time its exercise amounted to a discrimination against or a burden on 
interstate commerce.42 But the thriving economic conditions of the late 19th century prompted 
Congress to pass innovative legislation such as the Interstate Commerce Act of 188743, the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 189044, and many others as from 1903. These statutes found a 
safe harbor - as against constitutionality attacks - on the Commerce Clause and drew 
Congress' attention to this clause's great potential as a source of federal power; thereafter, a 
new phase in the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause adjudication ensued.45 
Initially, however, the Court refused to accord the Clause's words a scope greater 
than that warranted by their natural sense. In Kidd v .. Pearson,46 where an Iowa statute 
prohibited instate manufacture of intoxicating liquor47 and did not exclude from the 
38 
"The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from 
the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is essentially a tautology." New 
York v. United States, 505 US. 144, 156-57 (1992),per Justice O'Connor. 
39 14 US. 304. 
40 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992). 
41 The following historical account on how the Supreme Court has constructed the Commerce Clause over time 
is a summary 0£ and heavily based on, the one offered by .Justice Jackson in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US. 111 (1942). 
42 Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568 (1852). 
43 24 Stat. 379. 
« 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. 
45 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.111, 121 (1942). 
46 128 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1888). 
47 Except for mechanical, medicinal, culinary or sacramental purposes; see 128 U.S. 1, 15 (1888). 
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prohibition that portion of the production that was intended to be exported out state, it 
was held that the statute did not embody an attempt to unduly interfere with the regulation 
of interstate commerce and that its effect on interstate commerce was too indirect to warrant 
federal authority; furthermore, a staying distinction between manufacture and commerce -
that influenced the Court's position for many years - was drawn by Justice Lamar: 
''No distinction is more popular to the common mind, or 
more clearly expressed in economic and political literature, 
than that between manufactures and commerce. Manufacture 
is transformation - the fashioning of raw materials into a 
change of form for use. The functions of commerce are 
different. The buying and selling and the transportation 
incidental thereto constitute commerce; and the regulation of 
commerce in the constitutional sense embraces the regulation 
at least of such transportation. The legal definition of the 
term, as given by this court in County of Mobile v. Kimball, 
102 U.S. 691, 702, is as follows: "Commerce with foreign 
countries, and among the States, strictly considered, consists 
in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation, 
and the transportation and transit of persons and property, 
as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities." 
If it be held that the term includes the regulation of all such 
manufactures as are intended to be the subject of commercial 
transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it 
would also include all productive industries that contemplate 
the same thing. The result would be that Congress would be 
invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to 
regulate, not only manufactures, but also agriculture, 
horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining - in 
short, every branch of human industry. For is there one of 
them that does not contemplate, more or less clearly, an 
interstate or foreign market? Does not the wheat grower of 
the Northwest, and the cotton planter of the South, plant, 
cultivate, and harvest his crop with an eye on the prices at 
Liverpool, New York, and Chicago? The power being vested 
in Congress and denied to the States, it would follow as an 
inevitable result that the duty would devolve on Congress to 
regulate all of these delicate, multiform, and vital interests -
interests which in their nature are and must be, local in all the 
details of their successful management." 
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In United States v. E. C. Knight Co. ,48 where the acquisition of the four Philadelphia 
sugar refineries by American Sugar Refining Company were alleged to constitute a combination 
in restraint of trade, a similar reasoning was given by Chief Justice Fuller: ''An attempt to 
monopolize, or the actual monopoly of, the manufacture was [not] an attempt, whether 
executory or consummated, to monopolize commerce, even though, in order to dispose of 
the product, the instrumentality of commerce was necessarily invoked." After all, "[c]ommerce 
succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it."49 These cases were followed by many others 
in which the Court found the challenged statutes exceeded Congress' power under the 
Commerce Clause .. 50 
Moreover, while what precedes commerce is beyond Congress' reach, that which 
relates to it only indirectly also is. The employment of individuals by an intrastate business 
was held to be related only indirectly to interstate commerce in A. L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. ·v. United States51 , where the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional 
regulations that fixed the hours and wages of "intrastate" employees. Indeed, as Chief 
Justice Hughes stated, "the distinction between direct and indirect effects of intrastate 
transactions upon interstate commerce must be recognized as a fundamental one, essential 
to the maintenance of our constitutional system. Otherwise, as we have said, there would be 
virtually no limit to the federal completely centralized government."52 
The tide, nevertheless, slowly began to change in 1914 with Houston, E. & W T. R. 
Co. v. United States,, 53 where the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered three railroad 
carriers not to discriminate against carriage as between Texas and Louisiana by means of 
charging rates higher than those generally charged for transportation within Texas. The 
Court upheld the Commission's order and stated:54 
48 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895). 
"[Congress1 authority, extending to these interstate carriers as 
instruments of interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the 
right to control their operations in all matters having such a 
close and substanti.al re'4tiion to interstate traffic that the control 
is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the 
efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of 
conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted 
upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance ... 
49 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895). See Carter v. Carter Coal Co, 298 U.S. 238, 304, per Justice Sutherland ("Mining 
brings the subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it"). 
so Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US. 111, 122 (1942). 
51 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
52 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935). 
53 234 U.S. 342. 
54 Per Justice Hughes at 351-52. 
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Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers 
are so related that the government of the one involves the 
control of the other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is 
entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for otherwise 
Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitutional 
authority and the State, and not the Nation, would be supreme 
within the national field." (emphasis added) 
It appears that in Justice Hughes' judgment in Houston the Court has taken its first 
effective step towards its modern construction of the Commerce Clause - the recognition 
that a "close and substantial relation to interstate traffic" is enough for an activity to be 
federally regulated under the Commerce Clause. Thus, "the mechanical application oflegal 
formulas",55 such as manufacture-commerce and direct-indirect-effect dichotomies, gave 
way to an economic measure of substantial impact on interstate trade. Commerce among 
states was no longer a "technical legal conception", tied to its grammatical meaning, but 
rather a "practical one, drawn from the course ofbusiness",56 particularly one that incorporates 
a considerable economic cornponent.57 Indeed, Chief Justice Stone in United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co. 58 could not have put it more plainly: 
"The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the 
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those 
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the 
exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation 
of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate 
end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate 
interstate commerce ... [N]o form of state activity can 
constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the 
commerce clause to Congress. Hence the reach of that power 
extends to those intrastate :activities which in a substantial way 
interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power." 
The main argument in favor of this broadened view appears to be that the power to 
govern interstate commerce would be unduly prostrated could it not reach those intrastate 
activities that ultimately amount to trade among the states, particularly because there seems to 
be no trade among states that cannot be at the same time trade within one state. The point was 
remarkably stressed by Chief Justice Hugh es in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. :59 
55 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942). 
56 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905), per Justice Holmes. 
57 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942). 
58 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942). 
59 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
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''Although activities may be intrastate in character when 
separately considered, if they have such a dose and substantial 
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential 
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and 
obstructions, Congress cannot be denied tl1e power to exercise 
that control. Undoubtedly, the scope of this power must be 
considered in the of our dual system of government 
and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon 
interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace 
them, in view of our complex society, would effectually 
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what 
is local and create a completely centralized government. The 
question is necessarily one of degree. 
The decision in United States v. Darby60 was pn~d11:ted on the similar o:;_L~,~.,,~w· 
"The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not 
confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It 
extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce or the exercise of the power over it as 
to make regulation of them appropriate means to the 
attainment of a legitimate the exercise of the granted 
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce." 
Likewise in United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.:61 
" ... [N]o form of state activity can constitutionaUy thwart the 
regulatory power granted by the comrnerce clause to Congress. 
Hence the reach of that power extends to those intrastate 
activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct 
the exercise of the granted power." 
The effect of these decisions is that a given needs no longer be 
commerce - it can pretty much be anything neither among states - it can be local - to be 
constitutionally subject to federal regulation, as as "it exerts a substantial economic 
effect on interstate commerce", even if such effect is indirect. 62 
Such an interpretation of the Commerce Clause was classically endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in Wickard v. Filburn tl1e most far reaching example of Commerce 
Clause authority over intrastate activityi'63 • In that case, Mr. Filburn, a small farmer in Ohio, 
60 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941),per Justice Stone. 
61 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942), per Chief Justice Stone. 
62 Wickard v: Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
63 United States v. Lopez, 514 US. 549, 560 (1995), per Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
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used to raise each year a small acreage of wheat for feeding the poultry and livestock on the 
farm, making flour for home consumption and selling out the remainder. 64 In July 1940, 
the Secretary of Agriculture allotted him, pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938 (AAA), 65 a quota limiting his 1941 crop produce to an area of 11. 1 acres and a normal 
yield of 20.1 bushels of wheat an acre. Mr. Filburn was given notice of such allotment twice, 
before sowing, in July 1940, and again before harvesting, in July 1941. Nevertheless, he 
cultivated 23 acres and exceeded his wheat quota by 239 bushels. Therefore, he was subjected 
to a marketing penalty of $117.11, which he refused to pay under, among others, the 
allegation that the J\AA was unconstitutional, since not warranted by the Commerce Clause.66 
The Court held that Congress had commerce power to regulate consumption of home-
grown wheat because, even if the wheat produce is not sold out state or even in state, its 
production beyond the allotted quota, and consequently its consumption by the very farmer 
that grew it - supplying a need that otherwise probably would be supplied by purchasing 
wheat from other farmers - unduly abates demand for wheat available in the market, affecting 
negatively the commodity price nationwide. Furthermore, the Court found that that Mr. 
Filburn's "own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough 
to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken 
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial". Justice Jackson so 
reasoned:67 
"It is well established by decisions of this Court that the 
power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate 
the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in 
and practices affecting such prices. One of the primary 
purposes of the Act in question was to increase the market 
price of wheat, and to that end to limit the volume thereof 
that could affect the market. It can hardly be denied that a 
factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed 
wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market 
conditions. This may arise because being in marketable 
condition such wheat overhangs the market and, if induced 
by rising prices, tends to flow into the market and check price 
increases. But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies 
a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be 
64 Except for a portion that was kept for the following seeding. 
65 
"The general scheme of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as related to wheat [was] to control 
the volume moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and 
the consequent abnormally low or high wheat prices and obstructions to commerce." Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 US. 111, 115 (1942), per Justice Jackson. 
66 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US. 111, 114-15 (1942). 
67 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US. 111, 127-29 (1942). 
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reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat 
in this sense competes with wheat in commerce. The 
stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function 
quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon. This 
record leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have 
considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown, 
if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have a 
substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to 
stimulate trade therein at increased prices." (emphasis added) 
Even though it is clear that Laughlin, Darlry and Wickard did not purport to 
foreclose the possibility of any limit as to the Commerce Power - as subsequent cases68 
persistently sought a "rational basis for concluding that an activity sufficiently effected interstate 
commerce"69 - they effectively ended up expanding its scope in such a way as to relegate the 
limit question to a merely hypothetical level of inquiry. Wbile conceptually no one would 
deny the necessity and appropriateness of a limit to congressional authority, whatever the 
limit may be, lest obliterate the very federalist constitutional element, in practice it became 
hard to devise circumstances in which the economic effect on interstate commerce of any 
activity- which Congress would ever be interested in regulating- would be more neghgible 
than that traced out in Wickard. The question one could easily raise as against the thesis there 
advanced is, whereas individual activities, however localized and insignificant by themselves, 
when widely practiced across the nation come to exert in their aggregate a substantial econornic 
effect on interstate commerce, whether Congress would be interested at all in regulating 
isolated and infrequent activities. It appears that the cumulative effect principle there adopted 
would place the limit to congressional power as far as where Congress would never dream of 
going. The bottom line then is that such limit, though theoretically existent,70 would not in 
effect restrain Congress' regulatoty appetite to the slightest degree; such limit would be as 
useful as one prohibiting people from walking through stones. Such position could hardly 
rebut a characterization of hypocritical and platonic.71 Perhaps Justice Douglas's warning in 
his dissenting opinion in Maryland 'V. Wirtz was not completely devoid of reason if one 
focuses on how the substantial effect test has been applied in some instances rather than 
how it has been repeatedly phrased: ''.All activities affecting commerce, even in the minutest 
68 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-280 (1981); Perez v. 
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-156 (1971); Katzenbach•~ McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964); Heart 
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-253 (1964). 
69 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995), per Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
70 As alluded to in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) ("This Court has always recognized that the 
power to regulate commerce, though broad indeed, has limits"). 
71 One commentator suggests that the constitutional doctrine inaugurated with Laughlin is self-contradictory 
and has paid lip service to the idea that Congress' power is limited. Donald H. Regan, How to Think about 
the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 M1rn. L. REV. 554 (1995). 
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degree, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 1.11, may be regulated and controlled by Congress. 
Commercial activity of every stripe may in some way interfere "with the [interstate] flow of 
merchandise" or interstate travel."72 
But behind such a change in doctrine lies, as usual, a change in policy, started much 
earlier by the political branches and now sanctioned by the judicial department. As a response 
to the deregulated climate charged with enabling the Great Depression, the New Deal was 
introduced and with it came a new regulatory paradigm that cleared the way to the emergence 
of the administrative state. A new set of historical circumstances also propped op that trend. 
Enterprises that one or two decades earlier conducted operations restricted to the local or 
regional level had expanded and now were national in scope. 73 Many of them purchased 
supply in one state, manufactured in another, and sold their products in a third. Accordingly, 
a considerably greater number of businesses were operating on a multi-state basis and thus 
were connecting intrastate markets and making them more interdependent. Finally, new 
economic and social conditions prompted a new ideology in the Supreme Court - one that 
was quick in charging the Court's preceding position as one that artificially "constrained the 
authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce".74 
Since Wickard took the last step in establishing the substantial f!!fect test, there 
have been three distinguishable categories of activities that Congress has been authorized to 
regulate under the Commerce Power authority - activities (i) involving the channels of 
interstate commerce;75 (ii) involving the instrumentalities of interstate commerce;76 or (iii) 
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.77 Undoubtedly, it is the last category the 
one that has warranted the unprecedented expansion of federally regulated activities. However, 
it is not clear, as Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted in Lopez v. United States,78 in the cases 
decided by the Supreme Court, how substantial - if substantial at all - the relation of an 
activity to interstate commerce has to be before it is regulable by Congress, although it 
definitely cannot be trivial.79 
72 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 204 (1968). 
73 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995). 
74 United States v. Lopez., 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995), per Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
75 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241 (1964). 
76 See, e.g., Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911); Houston, E. & WT. R. Co. v. United States, 
234 U.S. 342 (1914); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
77 See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (intrastate coal 
mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-156 (1971) (intrastate extortionate credit transactions); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964) (restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies); 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, foe. v. United States, 379 U.S. 2:41, 252-253 (1964) (inns and hotels catering to 
interstate guests); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (production and consumption of homegrown 
wheat); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (labor relations). 
78 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 
79 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-60 (1995). 
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If Wickard, in 1942, started a long historical period during which no aspect of 
American life was sufficiently unrelated to interstate commerce to escape regulation by 
Congress, United States v. Lopez,80 in 1995, for the first time since the New Deal held the 
that the Commerce Power was inadequate to sustain a law81 and reversed the preceding 
trend. Lopez, a senior student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, was tipped off 
as carrying a concealed handgun (with five bullets) within school premises. He was then 
arrested, charged and indicted with knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone, in 
violation of§ 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), a federal Act. 
His defense, on the basis of which his conviction was reversed in appeal, posited that the 
GFSZA was unconstitutional since beyond Congress' reach under the Commerce Clause.82 
The Supreme Court held 5-4 that:83 
"Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has 
nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. 
Section 922( q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be 
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, 
therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations 
of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial 
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects 
interstate commerce." 
The Court further held that § 922( q) had no jurisdictional element upon which to 
decide, on a case-by-case analysis, whether the firearm possession in question sufficiently 
affects interstate commerce to warrant federal outlawing. It referred to 18 U.S.C:. § 1202(a) as 
an example of a provision that contains a jurisdictional element that limits its proscriptive 
reach to a discrete subset of firearm possessions that actually affect interstate commerce.84 
Finally, it held that the GFSZA legislative history included no findings as to support a 
legislative judgment that the regulated firearm possession had a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce - a relation that, if existed, was not visible to the naked eye.85 
The Government's argument was twofold. First, it alleged that violent crimes, as 
those usually connected with firearm possession, bring about a substantial social cost, and 
that such cost, through the mechanism of insurance, spreads throughout the population; 
additionally, it argued that violent crimes generally discourage people from traveling to areas 
130 
.514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
81 JEROME A. BARRON & C THOMAS DIENES, CoNSTJTUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 79 (West, 5th ed. 2003). 
82 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995). 
83 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995), per Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
84 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561--62 (1995). 
85 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995). 
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of the country that are perceived to be unsafe. Second, the Government alleged that "the 
presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to the educational process by threatening 
the learning environment. A handicapped educational process, in turn, will result in a less 
productive citizenry. That, in turn, would have an adverse effect on the Nation's economic 
well-being", substantially affecting interstate commerce.86 
However creative and accurate - at least from a sociological perspective - the 
Government's arguments might have been, the Court found it was unable to go along with 
them for consequentialist considerations. First, the Court found - and the Government's 
counsel was not able to show otherwise - that if the Government's "cost of crime" argument 
was accepted it would become hard to perceive a limitation to federal power. Second, as the 
"national productivity" argument was based on "inference upon inference", and went through 
a long causal chain - (guns at school) - (violent crimes) - (handicapped education) - (less 
productive citizenry) - (economic well-being) - (interstate commerce) - its acceptance would 
require the acceptance, as regulable under the Commerce Clause, of all those sets of activities 
that made up its logical intermediary steps - including criminal law enforcement and education 
- some of which were traditionally understood as falling primarily within the States'' 
sovereignty. Further, the productive citizenry argument would make even family law- Isn't 
an individual in a happy marriage more productive than another undergoing divorce? -
subject to federal regulation. 87 It appeared to the Court that such implications would be 
incompatible with the standing constitutional structure:88 
"To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would 
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would 
bid fair to convert congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained 
by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken 
long steps down that road, giving great deference to 
congressional action. The broad language in these opinions 
has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but 
we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require 
us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers 
does not presuppose something not enumerated, cf. Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824)~ and that there never will be a 
distinction bet\,Veen what is truly national and what is truly 
local, cf ]ones(~ Laughlin Steel, 301U.S.1, 30 (1937), This we 
are unwilling to do." 
86 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-64 (1995). 
87 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). 
88 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995). 
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If Congress' regulatory authority had any bounds, Lopez made them effective.89 The 
enduring strength of Lopez and its historical significance as of closing up one era, marked by 
the New Deal and the expanding administrative state, and giving rise to a new one, sensitive 
to a revitalized conception of federalism, were shown in two cases adjudged in 2000 by the 
Supreme Court. 
Inf ones 7J. United States,90 Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail through a window into 
a home, owned and occupied by his cousin, in Fort Wayne, Indiana.Jones was convicted of 
arson, a federal crime,91 for damaging by means of fire any property used in commerce-
affecting activity. The issue was whether arson of an owner-occupied private residence fell 
within the scope of the statute. 92 The Government argued that it did as the property was 
used in commerce-affecting activities in three ways: (i) as a collateral to secure a mortgage 
from an Oklahoma lender; (ii) to obtain a casualty insurance policy from a Wisconsin insurer; 
and (iii) to receive natural gas from sources outside Indiana.93 The Court held:94 
"Were we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation 
of§ 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside 
the federal statute's domain. Practically every building in our 
cities, towns, and rural areas is constructed with supplies that 
have moved in interstate commerce, served by utilities that 
have an interstate connection, financed or insured by enterprises 
that do business across state lines, or bears some other trace 
of interstate commerce. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 757 (1982) (observing that electric energy is consumed 
"in virtually every home" and that "no State relies solely on its 
own resources" to meet its inhabitants' demand for the 
product). If such connections sufficed to trigger§ 844(i), the 
statute's limiting language, "used in" any commerce-affrcting 
activity, would have no office."95 
In United St.ates ·v. Morrison,96 Brzonkala, enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 
accused Morrison, a member of the varsity football team, of sexually assaulting her and 
89 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000). 
90 529 U.S. 848. 
91 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), transcribed in the text in relevant part only. 
92 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850-51 (2000). 
93 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 855 (2000). 
94 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000), per Justice Ginsburg. 
95 By so restricting the scope of "property used in commerce-affecting activity", the Court avoided a 
construction that would give rise to "grave and doubtful constitutional questions", in light of the 
principle established in United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Deli:tware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 
408 (1909). 
96 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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brought a suit for a federal civil remedy under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.97 
Brzonkala alleged that this attack caused her severe emotional distress and that she had to 
start taking prescribed antidepressant medication. Shortly after, she withdrew from the 
university. Although, she was held to have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, 
the trial court struck down the provision she relied on as falling without Congress' regulatory 
authority under the Commerce Clause as interpreted in Lopez.98 The United States intervened 
to defend its constitutionality and, supported by congressional findings,99 argued that gender-
motivated violence affected interstate commerce 
"by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from 
engaging in employment in interstate business, and from 
transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate 
commerce; ... by diminishing national productivity, increasing 
medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the 
demand for interstate products." 
The Court dismissed the Government's argument for gender-motivated violent 
crimes were not economic activity and held that "[w]hile we need not adopt a categorical rule 
against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, 
thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of 
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature."100 The Court also went on 
to state what can be said to be the main rationale behind the current understanding that an 
effective limit to Congress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause is appropriate 
in a federalist system: 101 
"If accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow Congress to 
regulate any crime as long as tl1e nationwide, aggregated impact 
of that crime has substantial effects on employment, 
production, transit, or consumption. Indeed, if Congress 
may regulate gender-motivated violence, it would be able to 
regulate murder or any other type of violence since gender-
motivated violence, as a subset of all violent crime, is certain 
to have lesser economic impacts than the larger class of which 
it is a part. Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit 
Congress to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in 
Lopez, be applied equally as well to family law and other areas 
of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of 
97 42 U.S.C. § 13981 was designed offer a remedy against crimes of violence motivated by gender. 
98 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602-05 (2000). 
99 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385. 
100 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) .. 
101 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000). 
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marriage, divorce, and chilldrearing on the national economy 
is undoubtedly significant ... Under our written Constitution, 
however, the limitation of congressional authority is not solely 
a matter oflegislative grace. As we have repeatedly noted, the 
Framers crafted the federal system of government so that the 
people's rights would be secured by the division of power. 
No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting 
and applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this 
Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the 
constitutional text." 
As seen above, the interpretation of the Commerce Clause has evolved, 102 from a 
narrower construction, both closer to its grammatical and legal meaning and more loyal to 
the Framer's intent, to a broader one, highly elaborated and economicized, and arguably 
more suitable for the more interconnected and smaller world of ours. While the broadly-
written constitutional text, in the relevant part, has not been altered over its 215 years of 
existence, the construction of its meaning has evolved, has been adapted by the Supreme 
Court - within the discretion the people as represented by the Framers appears to have left 
to it - as different historical circumstances arguably would have had the people and the 
Framers, with the same fundamental principals and ultimate ends in mind, written it at the 
present time .. While amending the constitutional text in pace with history would have 
avoided strained and apparently illegitimate legal constructions, recurring amendments could 
have threatened the invaluable political stability secured by a prolonged exercise of farsighted 
and unselfish political self-restraint and carefully nurtured by a conservative and prudent 
judicial branch. Jusltice O'Connor associates constitutional law's evolution with the original 
constitutional framework's flexibility: 103 
"This framework has been sufficiently flexibie over the past 
two centuries to allow frx enormous changes in the nature of 
government. The Federal Government undertakes activities 
today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers in 
two senses; first, because the Framers would not have 
conceived that any government would conduct such activities; 
and second, because the Framers would not have believed 
that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would 
assume such responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon 
the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in 
language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the 
Federal Government's role." 
102 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 607 (2000). 
103 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). 
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Undeniably, the Commerce Clause is an illustrative example of that more general 
trend of evolution: 104 
"The volume of interstate commerce and the range of 
commonly accepted objects of government regulation have, 
however, expanded considerably in the last 200 years, and the 
regulatory authority of Congress has expanded along with 
them. As interstate commerce has become ubiquitous, 
activities once considered purely local have come to have effects 
on the national economy, and have accordingly come within 
the scope of Congress' commerce power .... The actual scope 
of the Federal Government's authority with respect to the 
States has changed over the years, therefore,. but the 
constitutional structure underlying and limiting that authority 
has not." 
Nevertheless, however intendated our world is today that even the most local activity 
is not purely local and its economic repercussions may easily cross states' boundaries, the 
principle of federalism as a double security - along with that of checks and balances -
protective of individuals' civil liberties as against tyranny cannot be overridden under the 
standing constitutional structure. /\.. compromise between the competing interests of a 
strong economic unit and a government respectful of individuals' freedom implies a limit 
to the highly inflated notion of commerce among states; a limit that since Houston in 1914 
has no longer been inherent in the provision's own words and that arguably since Laughlin 
in 1937 and Wickard in 1942 has been even absent from the modern construction of those 
words; a limit that, therefore, appears to derive instead and solely from outer, overarching 
constitutional principles such as federalism - as opposed to a unitary and centralized system 
of government; a limit that, though existent and forceful as recently shown in LopezJones 
and Morrison, by virtue of its very nature does not seem sometimes to be determinable 
other than arbitrarily, with no objective criteria. 105 Unfortunately, an inevitable vice of 
standardless, subjective limits is their defenseless vulnerability as to the whims of the political 
climate. In the case of environmental legislation and their reach, it seems that purely 
developmental, anti-environmental interests could, in light of prejudicially slanted limits, be 
104 New York v. United States, SOS U.S. 144, 158 (1992). 
105 Such arbitrariness may be expressed in other terms. For instance, one commentator suggests that 
Lopez sets a limit rather on the type of argument that the Government, either Congress in legislative 
findings or the Solicitor General in briefings before the Court, may advance in support of an Act of 
Congress' constitutionality. Such argument, to be acceptable, must take the doctrine of enumerated 
powers seriously and recognize the possibility of some limits to Congress' Commerce Power. Thus, 
as long as the Government's attorneys observe Lopez recipe, the Court may not really care as to 
whether the Act under attack actually invades any remaining province of States' exclusive sovereignty. 
Deborah J Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 689-90 (1995). 
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inextricably disguised as pro-civil liberties, anti-tyrannical arguments that ultimately thwart 
the expansion and development of Environmental Law - perhaps even at the expense of 
individuals' actual and full enjoyment of their remaining freedoms. 
CONCLUSION: 
Can The Commerce Power Be a Burden on Environmental Law? 
Does the Commerce Power pose a limit to the development of Environmental 
Law? Two considerations appear to be necessary for one to understand the proper scope of 
this question. First, if the commerce power is the main source of federal environmental law 
in the United States, in what sense can it curb its development? In more dramatic words, if, 
under the standing constitutional paradigm, federal environmental law would not there be 
but for the commerce power, how can the commerce power be viewed as a hindrance against, 
as opposed to the very source of, environmental law? Indeed, if the question posed were 
understood in its literal meaning, it would simply not make sense. However, the meaning 
intended to be attached to it is another; a meaning that could perhaps be better expressed by 
the following fom1ulation: If the Constitution was amended with an Environmental Clause, 
in addition to the Commerce Clause, would Congress' authority to regulate the environment 
be enlarged, and if so, by how much? Or yet in a negative formulation: Is Congress' authority 
to regulate the environment contracted, and if so by how much, by the fact that its source is 
the Commerce Clause as opposed to a hypothetical Environmental Clause? Second, one 
would ask what is meant by a '"hindrance" to the development of environmental law. Here 
is suggested a political meaning to such word: There is a hindrance106 to the development of 
environmental law every time the state of environmental protection as afforded by the legal 
system lags behind the one democratically desired by the people of the United States. In 
other words, the hindrance is determined by the existence of an environment-disfavoring 
discrepancy between the level of protection actually achieved in legal te1ms and that ultimately 
desired in political tem1s. Such a divergence could be attributed to an institutional inefficiency 
in democratic terms, which illegitimately would favor some interests to the detriment of 
others and effectuates a distortion in the institutional representation of the people's political 
will. One of such institutional, political-representation-distorting inefficiencies could be the 
Commerce Clause functioning as an Environmental Clause. That is this paper's hypothesis 
- to be confirmed or refuted as the research proposed proceeds. 
An attempt to pursue the main question posed in this paper one should consider 
two distinct roles the Commerce Clause has played. On the one hand, the Commerce Clause 
has operated as an affirmative basis for Congress to legislate, giving rise to the affirmative 
106 Or "limit", "restraint", "encumbrance", "curb", however one want to call it, 
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commerce power; on the other hand, it has acted as a check on States' legislation that puts a 
burden on interstate commerce, constituting the negative commerce power. For federal 
environmental law to fall within Congress' constitutional regulatory authority, it must have 
a relation to interstate commerce substantial enough to satisfy the threshold set in Lopez. In 
contrast, for state environmental law not to intrude into Congress' monopolistic power 
over interstate commerce, it cannot amount to a discrimination against interstate commerce. 
In a simplistic formulation, one could say that federal environmental legislation is 
unconstitutional unless it affects interstate commerce, whereas state environmental legislation 
is unconstitutional unless it does not affect interstate commerce; or even more plainly, one 
could say that what is required of federal law - that it affects interstate commerce - is 
forbidden to state la'v. However, such proposition may be inaccurate to the extent that the 
effect on interstate commerce that is required for federal law may be, at least theoretically, 
different in nature from that that is forbidden to state law; for one could argue that even 
Congress would not be constitutionally empowered to pass legislation that unreasonably 
discriminates against one state in favor of another in interstate commerce. 
Further, notwithstanding the effects' different nature qualification just made, one 
could think that a constitutional interpretation of the federalist system that divides the 
power to regulate the environment in such way that federal and state legislations do not clash 
or overlap, as the one referred to above, works generally to the advantage of environmental 
protection. Nevertheless, one would have to concede that, if that proposition is true, it may 
be refuted in some cases. For instance, with respect to land and water, Supreme Court cases 
may have indicated that the regulation ofland and water resources may not l,lave a elation to 
interstate commerce sufficiently substantial to warrant federal authority and, at the same 
time, it may effect too restrictive a burden on interstate commerce to warrant state authority. 
The bottom line, in cases as such, would be that neither Congress nor the States may enjoy 
regulatory authority over natural resources. 107 If such federalist division of powers was 
intended to serve a cooperative federalism, in this particular case at least it has turned out to 
serve a self-destructive federalism. 
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